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In %sjgaper the economie effects of a regulating energy levy are ïllustrated usmg a small 
macro-economie empirical simulation model for TTie Netherlands, called theEnTech-model. The 
model is especially designed to reckon with the effects of changes in prices on the bias of 
technological progress. It appears that a so-called employment doublé dividend, i.e., increasing 
employment and decreasing energy use at the same time, can occur. A general levy yields 
stronger results than a levy on household use only. However, the stronger effects of a general 
levy on employment and energy use are accompanied by shrinking production and, under some 
scenarios, by decreasing disposable income of workers and/or non-workers. Furthermore, total 
R&D-expenditures decrease due to shrinking production. This latter effect can, however, be 
compensated using part of the proceeds of the levy. All in all, the effects of a regulating energy 
levy will not be very spectacular, considering the size of the levy. 
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A major economie policy question of today is to what extent (regulating) energy levies can 
contribute to a reduction of energy demand and hence of greenhouse gas emissions. The 
economie mechanisms which are set at work by the introduction of an energy levy and by the 
redistribution of the proceeds are rather complex, so that only a model based analysis is capable 
of calculating the net effects of such levies. Two different ways of modelling the effects of 
energy levies emerge from the literature. Firstly the analysis is conducted using highly 
aggregated, theoretical, genera! equilibrium models which concentrate on second best policies 
for energy taxation (see e.g. Bovenberg and Van der Ploeg, 1992, 1993, 1994 and Bovenberg 
and De Mooij, 1992, 1993). The second approach uses disaggregatedempiricalmodekwhigh 
are either of the applied genera! equilibrium type (e.g. the GREEN-model of the OECD, see 
OECD, 1994) or are dynamic policy models in the Tinbergen tradition (e.g. the combined use 
of the SENECA energy model and the ATHENA multi-sector model by the Netherlands Central 
Planning Bureau (CPB, 1992) and the HERMES-model by the EC (see Laroui and Velthuijsen, 
1992a, 1992b)). 
This paper illustrates the economie effects jo£jsnergy levies and tiie redistribution of their 
proceeds using a relatively simple and aggregated empirical macroeconomic model for The 
Netherlands,. called the„EnTejch;mode_l, which intermediates between the two approaches 
sketched above. iLi^a^sjmalLdynamjc mpd.^ theory. Total 
productive capacity is not only determined by physical capital and labour, but also by energy, 
technology capital, energy saving technology capital and human capital as factor inputs. 
Technology capital does not only enhance the productivity of physical capital, but there are also 
spill-overs to human capital. In this manner the model reckons both with the externalities of 
investment in R&D and with price effects on the bias of technical progress. It must be 
emphasized that our model is not an applied general equilibrium model. It may illustrate the 
dynamics of the introduction of an energy levy. Moreover, the parameter values of the model 
are based on empirical results of the literature and the model is calibrated in such a manner that 
a dynamic simulation over the past adequately reproduces the historical time path of the 
observed endogenous variables. 
The simulation experiments assess the consequences of an energy levy for economie activity, 
employment and technological innovation. Onjhe one hand an energy levyT when introduced 
on a national level, may hurt the competitive position of a country, which has negative effects 
on economie activity and employment. On the otherJhandJimax^sojtinMate_enejgy_wying 
technological innovation, which can improvejhe competitive position of the national industry \ 
and which may shift the bias of technical progress away from labour saving. Moreover,. the ( 
proceeds of an energy levy can be used to decrease labour market taxes. In this context the \ 
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\rf energy tax may yield a so-called doublé dividend: it may improve the quality of the enyironment 
and increase employment at the same time. In that case the loss of employment because of the 
deterioration of the competitive position shpuld be more than fully compensated by employment 
gains induced byjh^^b^titution of energy for other production factors including labour, by the 
reduction of labour costs, by the demand effects of the redistribution of the tax proceeds and 
by the shift from labour saving to energy saving technical progress. In our simulation 
experiment these underlying mechanisms are clarified further by a sensitivity analysis with 
respect to the key parameters of the model. The model allows to distinguish between the effects 
of a levy on industrial use of energy and a levy on private consumption of energy. Furthermore 
various ways of redistribution of the proceeds are considered. 
Section 1 shortly surveys the literature on theoretical and empirical models of energy taxes. 
Section 2 provides an outline of the EnTech-model. Section 3 gives the results of our 
experiments and section 4 concludes. 
1. Literature 
The major aim of a regulating energy levy is to evoke a behaviourial change which through 
substitution and through technological change induces a decrease of energy demand_._Thus.a 
regulating levy is wor.jt_PigojLvian.iax_wfaich_is_jaised....in_,order to...cover...the_costs__.of. 
ejivirpnmental damage, nor is it. a gener.al.„tax..whi.ch-aims at raising gpyemment income. 
Moreover, taxation is just one amongst many other instruments of environmental poHcy,.. such 
as subsidies,, regulations, information^emissipn standards and marketable emission permits (see 
e.g. Sterner, 1990, for a short review). In this paper we only consider the regulating energy 
levy as it is the major instrument in the policy proposals of, e.g., the EC and the Dutch 
government, which aim at cürbihg energy consumption and greenhouse gas emissions1. In the 
case of regulating levies, the redistribution of the proceeds should foster fiscal neutrality. An 
open question in the proposals is whether there should be ex ante or ex post fiscal neutrality. 
The first approach implies the redistribution of the current proceeds of the levy only, whereas 
according to the second approach all net revenues are to be redistributed: both the current 
proceeds and the endogenously determined and possibly negative indirect revenues. Theoreti-
cally the latter approach is most elegant, but in practice it will be difficult to determine the 
endogenous component of the revenues. However, in our model exercises we consider ex post 
budget neutraUty. 
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Li Theoretical literature 
The effects of energy taxes on environmental quality, economie activity and employment have -
been investigated both by means of tiieoretical models and empirical models, In.the theoretical. 
literature general equilibrium models play.a major role. Bovenberg and others consider the 
effects of energy levies in the context of general equilibrium models. In a number of papers „ 
Bovenberg and Van der Ploeg (e.g. Bovenberg and Van der Ploeg, 1992, 1993, 1994) analyse 
the effects of environmental policies in a second best framework of a small open economy. It 
appears that the occurrence of an employment doublé dividend, i.e. a cleaner environment and 
increasing employment at the same time, is strongly dependent upon the existence of a fixed 
Jactor in production. In a model with only two production factors, labour and resources, where 
the price of resources is exogenously given by the world market price, labour, not surprisingly, 
always bears the whole tax burden. Replacing a labour tax with a resource tax in this case 
amounts to replacing an explicit tax on labour with an implicit tax on labour. However, when 
there is a fixed factor of production, part of the costs of an environmental tax can be shifted to 
this fixed factor. This suggests that an employment doublé dividend is more likely in the short 
run than in the long run, since in me short run more factors are fixed. It appears that the larger 
the share of the fixed factor in production, the lower the profit tax and the larger the substitution 
possibilities between labour and resources^ the easier to. shift the costs of an environmental tax 
to the fixed factor and the more likely an employment doublé dividend will be. 
Bovenberg and De Mooij (e.g. Bovenberg and De Mooij, 1992,1993) also analyse the effects 
of environmental taxes in a general equilibrium framework. They allow for the existence of 
income transfers provided by the government. In their model an employment doublé dividend 
can appear even when there is perfect international capital mobility. In fact, workers are able 
to shift part of the burden of the environmental tax to transfer recipients and owners of financial 
wealth. In order to illustrate this mechanism Bovenberg and De Mooij (1993) provide a 
numerical simulation again using a model of a small open economy facing exogenous world 
market prices for commodities and capital. In this model two classes of households, differing 
with respect to their sources of income, are explicitly modelled. The model is calibrated using 
Dutch data for 1989. It appears that a broad basedenergy_tax_on both firms and households 
yields a (weak) doublé dividend at the expense of a falUn_ngnJabour income. ;. V 
1.2 Empirical studies 
A number of empirical exercises using large macro-economie models have been conducted in 
order to calculate the consequences of energy levies on energy; use andgreenhouse gas 
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emissions and economie growth.^However, the outcomes of these exercises are difficult to 
compare because they relate to different types of measures, to various levels at which the 
measures are to be taken_(worldwide, OECD, European Union,, national), and because the » 
.baselines used_ for the model simulations differ from each other. Moreover, most model 
simulations focus on the effectiveness of the energy levies for the reduction of emissions and 
do not explicitly take labour market developments into consideration. This holds true for the 
exercises using the global GREEN model (OECD, 1994), an applied genera! equilibrium model, 
which calculate the level of carbon taxes per region needed in order to comply under different 
scenario's with a global Toronto type agreement. By 2020, the tax, averaged over all regions, 
should be $215 per ton of carbon (in 1985$), but varies widely amongst regions, from $955 per 
ton in the pacifie basin to $63 in China (see also Bradley and Fitzgerald, 1992). 
v 
On the other hand, the recent 'White Book' of the European Commission (EC, 1993) focusses 
on the relation between the labour market (employment) and economie growth. It presents the 
results of simulation exercises on the effects on employment of a reduction of the employer's 
contribution to social security financed by an energy levy and/or increasing the value added tax, 
using three different models. According to the global QUEST-model of the European 
Community this package of measures has, for the cummunity as a whole, a negative effect on 
employment. The results using the MIMIC-model, an applied general equilibrium model for The 
Netherlands, are mixed and depend upon the type of redistribution scheme. The linked multi-
sectoral HERMES-model shows moderate positive employment effects of a regulating energy 
levy in six EC-member states. 
Finally, the Dutch Central Planning Bureau (CPB, 1992) has made calculations on the effects 
of a 50% and a 100% levy, imposed at the OECD or national level2. According to these 
calculations thefebmpetitive position pf many energy-intensive industries is dramatically affected 
in the 'going-alone' scenario in case of a general energy levy, and a broader gepgraphical base 
(OECD) does not contribute sufficiently to the splutipn of this problem for industries in the 
jxppsed sector. According to these calculations, employment decreases considerably-in case of 
a general levy, whereas the impact of a household levy on employment is virtually nil. 
$y 
All in all, these model exercises do notjshaw any.convergency of eyidence with 
jdouble dividend .hypathesis^Yet. it is obvious that the energy levy is more efficiënt in reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions when it is effectuated at a worldwide level ratherüian at a Western 
European or national level. In the latter case the influence of industries closing down and/or 
mQyJng,,abroad is larger so that the competitive r^ositior^deteriorates. The resulting decrease of 
econpmic activity mitigates the ppssible ppsitiye effects pn emplpyment pf the redistribution of 
JÉ§ proceeds of the levy. 
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Differences between the outcomes of these model exercises also emerge because of differences 
injhe implementation of the measures in the model and because of differences in modelling the 
major mechanisms. For instance, the Central Planning Bureau explicitly reckons with the effects 
of industries moving abroad using additional information not contained in the model, whereas 
in other models, including ours, moving abroad and closing down of industries is implicitly 
described by substitution in the production function. Furthermore, the effect of higher energy 
prices on the bias of technological progress is not implemented in most models, or in a very 
superficial marnier. One of the major features of our EnTech-model is to endogenize this 
mechanism. 
2. The EnTech-model 
A major drawback for practical policy analysis is that, up to now, endogenous growth models 
are mainly theoretical. This paper uses an empirical simulation model for technology policy 
which is inspired by some features of endogenous growth theory, but which is not an empirical 
counterpart of these theoretical models. Our model tries to intermediate between these formal 
endogenous growth models and the traditional macroeconomic models used in policy analysis 
in The Netherlands; these empirical models are usually specified in a rather ad hoc marnier. At 
the core of our model is the production block, where investments in technology capital and in 
human capital play a major role. The external effects of R&D are modelled in such a way that 
R&D investments not only lead to more technology capital, but also have a positive impact on 
human capital through 'learning by doing' and 'learning by designing'. 
In order to capture the main characteristics of the structure of production and the role of 
technology capital in our simulation model, we use a framework of nested CES-functions, which 
allows for different elasticities of substitution between the various levels distinguished in the 
model. Whilst the marnier in which the various production factors are combined in such a nested 
construction is rather ad hoc, its design is based on arguments and empirical evidence from the 
literature, and it is open to sensitivity analysis (see Den Butter and Wollmer, 1992, for more 
details). For a similar approach we refer to Gelauff et al. (1991). 
Our simulation model takes the view that prices are rigid and that markets can be in 
disequilibrium for a prolongued period. In line with the traditional dynamic policy models for 
The Netherlands we assume that production is mainly demand determined. Therefore we derive 
the specification of the factor demand equations, which determine the factor inputs in the 
production block, from cost minimisation, given production (or productive capacity) and given 
the nested structure of the production block. Thus, the derived factor demand equations have 
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total production as scaling variable and the relative prices of all production factors as other 
explanatory variables. In order to make the specification of the factor demand equations more 
realistic and in conformity with empirical specifications from the literature we have included 
lagged reactions and additional explanatory variables into the factor demand equations. In that 
case combined factor demand will, through the production block, no longer automatically yield 
desired production, so that we have to consider one production factor as residual in the model. 
Labour demand is taken as the residual factor demand, so that the effects of technology and the 
resulting spill-overs on labour demand are implicitly described by the model3. The advantage 
of our disequilibrium approach over a general equilibrium model is, that the model describes 
the historical time path of major economie variables and that we are able to simulate the effects 
of (policy) shocks on the short and medium term. 
In this paper we only present a general outline of the model. For details we refer to the 
monograph of Den Butter and Wollmer (1992) which describes a previous version of the model. 
Appendix A gives a listing of the model equatioiré. Appendix B provides a glossary of symbols 
used. Figure 1 shows the structure of the production block. At the highest level of nesting 
productive capacity, yn, is a function of efficiency units of capital (including energy), Kc, and 
labour, Lc (A.l). Lc refers to efficiency units of labour, L, adjusted for changes in contractual 
working time (A.2). L is determined by the full capacity demand for labour, a, and the level 
of human capitat>/?C (A.3). Kc is determined by efficiency units of capital (excluding energy), 
KT, combined with energy, also measured in efficiency units (Ec; (AA)). 
Technology capital, Tc and (Td + TE + 7]), enters into the production block in two related 
ways. Firstly, firms accumulate knowledge by either undertaking research and development, 
which provides a domestically produced stock of technical capital, Td, or they import knowl-
edge, and have a 'substitute' stock of foreign technical capital T,. This technology capital is 
combined to Tc (A.8) which may be viewed as being embodied in capital, K, or disembodied 
and increasing the productivity of existing capital, or both, and thereby determines the level of 
efficiency units of capital, KT (A.5). Moreover, in order to endogenize energy saving 
technology, this version of the model distinguishes between general technology capital and 
cumulated investments in energy saving technology which enhances the efficiency of the use of 
energy (2^). Therefore, energy saving technology capital combined with input of 'raw' energy 
(E) yields efficiency units of energy (Ec; (A.10)). 
6 
Figure 1. Structure of production block 
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In line with recent theories of endogenous growth there is assumed to be spill-overs of knowl-
edge associated with research and development and the import of technical capital. This is 
assumed to augment the human capital of workers as they work with the new technologies, i.e. 
through iearning-by-doing' and 'learning-by-designing'. This augmentation of human capital 
combines, in a complementary manner, with the education level of workers, which is itself 
determined by real government expenditures on education, g* (A.12). 
When all factor inputs (including labour supply) were given, y„ would be endogenously 
determined by the production block. Hence 'causality' would run from the lower elements in 
the tree of Figure 1 (indicated by solid lines) to the highest hierarchical level where y„ is the 
final variable to be determined. However, as mentioned before, our model has productive 
capacity fully demand determined and labour demand, a, to follow as a residual (A.13); in this 
case a positive investment impulse will, ceteris paribus, result in less labour demand, but a 
higher level of labour productivity. Then 'causality' runs from the left to the right in Figure 1 
(indicated by broken lines) so that Lc and hence a result as final variables to be determined by 
the production structure. The model was calibrated on basis of this specification. 
Although the calibration of the model is based on actual annual time series data, with reference 
periöd 1972-1990, we have deliberately not tried to estimate the full model using this data set. 
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The two major reasons are that the model contains a lot of unobservables and that the 
information contents of the data set is too poor to yield plausible parameter estimates in the 
behavioural equations of the model. 
Instead, our calibration procedure uses a much wider set of information, namely information 
contained in the body of empirical knowledge. Moreover, when no empirical results are 
available from the literature, we include parameter estimates (or 'guesstimates') of our own. 
However, in those cases we do deliberately not present the usual set of test statistics, as our 
method of specifying the model makes this meaningless. Finally we note that in each 
behavioural equation the constant term is determined by least squares estimation. 
As mentioned before, the factor demand equations of the production block are derived demand 
equations, based on cost minimization given the desired level of productive capacity y„, and are 
extended in an ad hoc manner with adjustment lags and some additional explanatory variables 
suggested by the literature (see (A.15), (A.16) and (A.17)). The production block is calibrated 
in such a way that the (implicit) wage costs elasticity of labour demand amounts to about -0.5, 
which is in conformity with labour demand studies for The Netherlands. Government 
expenditure on education is exogenous to the model. 
Although we try to keep the model as simple as possible, we needed some disaggregation of the 
energy block for the simulation exercises of this paper. The industrial use of energy (£) is 
modelled in the same manner as the other factor demand equations and depends on the price of 
energy, the prices of the other. production factors and the volume of production as a scaling 
variable (A.24). In conformity with the international literature (see e.g. Seale jr. et al, 1991) 
we assume a long run price elasticity of -0.75 and a mean adjustment lag of 1 year. We note 
that the (absolute) value of this elasticity is rather high as compared to empirical fmdings for 
The Netherlands. The part of R&D-expenditures which are invested in energy saving technology 
depends on the relative price of energy in comparison with the price of R&D (A.19). Besides 
the industrial use of energy, the model also comprises an equation for the demand for energy 
by households. This energy consumption depends on the price of energy paid by households -
with a long run price elasticity of -0.5 - and on disposable income (A.29). 
The rest of the model is kept as simple as possible and its specification and calibration is 
derived from policy models in The Netherlands. Desired productive capacity is determined by 
aggregate demand, which gives the model a demand oriented character (A.37-A.46). In order 
to describe the quality competition with other industrialised countries, the import and export 
equations contain an indicator for the relative stand of technology (n'v), which is endogeneous 
in the model (see (A.30), (A.29) and (A.32)). Hence, a relative increase in R&D expenditures 
in The Netherlands will, according to the model, enhance the volume of exports and lower the 
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volume of imports, so that it fosters demand. Of course, part of this effect will also be achieved 
through price competition, which is modelled in the import and export equations in the usual 
manner. 
Prices at the goods market are determined by a simple mark-up price equation adding up the 
various factor costs, which can be associated with monopolistic competition ((A.33) and 
(A.34)). Wages are determined by a wage curve equation derived trom Graafland (1992) 
(A.37). This equation describes the wage negotiation process in the Dutch institutional setting. 
Finally the model contains a number of technical equations, which endogenize the government 
budget (A.44-A.53). Firstly, the financial deficit of the government is exogenous. Furthermore, 
the size of the wedge - i.e. the difference between gross labour costs and net wages - is 
determined endogenously to achieve ex post budget neutrality. All the additional revenues of 
the energy levy are redistributed to producers and/or consumers. 
We note that our model of endogenous energy saving technical progress distinguishes between 
thrge^ources,of a decrease in the d e m m ! i k J j M g x i i l £ ^ ?,,.. ^ * « ' ^ 
of energy: 
1. the Jncpnie jeffect, when the energy levy leads to a decrease in demand and hence in 
economie activity; 
2. substitution from energy to other factors of production; 
3. more energy, saving technology induced by the higher price of energy leading to, ceteris 
paribus, a lower demand for 'raw' energy. 
Most studies on the effects of energy prices on energy demand take both latter sources together, 
which is a decrease in the energy intensitity of production. 
3. Simulation results 
The aim of our simulation exercises using the model is threefold. Firstly, and most importantly, 
they are meant to illustrate the working of our model and especially those mechanisms that are 
associated with endogenizing (the bias of) technical progress. Secondly, the simulations may 
provide some quantitative indication of the effects of regulating energy levies. In this respect 
our calculations should be considered with caution because we run only very simple simulations 
and our model contains a number of assumptions on which litüe empirical evidence is available. 
For that reason we also conduct a sensitivity analysis, showing which parameter values and 
assumptions are crucial in the policy simulations and should be given empirical attention. Thus, 
we come to the third and implied aim of our policy simulations: they provide a guideline for 
further research on this subject. 
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The impulse-response tables of this paper give the differences between the baseline projection 
(1986-90) and the projection from the impulse for certain variables of interest which are 
endogenous in the model and which are relevant in the discussion on the doublé dividend 
hypothesis. 
3.1 The effects of an energy levy 
Injable 1 the results of an energy levy of 50% on the energy price, where the proceeds are 
used to lower the employers' contributions to social security payments, is given (employers' 
scenario). It appears that in the case of a general levy, i.e. a levy on the energy price of both 
.consumers and producers, energy. use decreases while employment increases. In the_short run 
the effects are smaller then in the longer run. This is due to the fact that in the short run the 
production structure is fixed mainly with respect to die composite capital input so that industrial 
energy use cannot decrease much. Also the consumers need some time to adjust their energy 
use. In.the longer run substitution possibilities between energy and labour are larger. However, 
this effect will be lmitïgated by shrinking production (relative to the reference path) and 
consequently decreasing use of all factors of production. In the first year the production growth 
increases due to substitution by households from energy use to other goods. In subsequent 
years, however, this effect is dominated by a slowdown in production growth as a consequence 
of increasing costs of production and hencea deterioration of the international competitive 
position. 
In flie short run disposable income increases due to the decreasing. taxburden on labour. As a 
matter of fact employees are able to shift part of the tax burden to employers.. However, in the 
longer run labour taxes increase again due to decreasing proceeds from the energy levy and thus 
disposable income decreases. Total expenditure on R&D decreases in the long run as a 
consequence of the slowdown of production growth; however, expenditure on energy saving 
R&D increases. 
Conluding. both energy use and unemployment are reduced at the expense of lower disposable 
income in the long run, especially of non-workers and a slowdown in production growth. 
In the case of a levy_gn_the energy price of households only, the effects on labour demand and 
energy use are much smaller. Production growth increases even in the long run, due to the fact 
that the producers do not face higher energy prices but do take advantage of the lower taxes on 
labour. Labour costs decrease relative to the reference path, and substitution takes place from 
energy, capital and technology (including energy saving technology) to labour. 
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_AHin aü.,^Ji£i)jcciuTence of an employment doublé dividend in our empincal model seems to 
be in accordancejyithjhei theoretical analysis of Bovenberg c.s. In the EnTech-model capital 
is largely fixed in the short run. Consequently it is possible to shift part of the burden from 
labour to capital. In the longer run this effect will die out; on the other hand, the existence of 
transfers and the fact that we do not imposè income neutrality, still allows to shift part of the 
burden away from workers to non-workers. Furthermore, the substitution elasticities are such 
that labour and energy are rather_good substitutes. Substitution to labour lowers the labour 
productivity which in turn puts a downward pressure on wages leading to additional substitution 
to labour. Finally, the effects on employment are enlarged because the model allows for 
endogenous decisions on technological progress. Higher energy prices induce a shift of 
technological progress from labour savingto energy saying technological progress. 
3.2 Alternative redistribution schemes 
An alternative for redistribution of the proceeds of the energy levy to employers' contributions 
to social security is to lower the employees' contribution to social security (employees' 
scenario). In table 2 the results of this exercise are given. The effects do not differ very much 
from those of table 1. The most striking difference is „that.disposable income of both workers 
and non-workers, under a general levy, now increases even in the long run, although wage costs 
decrease an^pnces.increase_.t03iarger .extent than in the ptevious exercise. This latter effect 
is dominated by the decrease in employees' contribution to social security, which is relatively 
large, since total proceeds are redistributed to the consumers, although they bear only part of 
the tax burden. Furthermore, higher disposable incomes boost consumption and hence 
production. 
The effects of a regulating energy levy with redistribution to employers, as shown in table 1, 
reveal that this scenario has a negative impact on total investments in technology. We can use 
part of the proceeds of the levy to compensate for this endogenous f all in R&D expenditures. 
Since total expenditures on R&D in the Netherlands are relatively small compared to the 
proceeds of the levy, only a minor part of the proceeds would be needed for this purpose. In 
table 3 the results of a regulating energy levy of 50% are given, where 98% of the proceeds 
are used to lower employers contributions to social security, while 2% of the proceeds of the 
levy are used for higher R&D expenditures. In fact this means that R&D expenditures are 
increased by about 6% in the first year. 
Now, under a general levy a doublé dividend still occurs. though slightlv weaker than in the 
employers' scenario. Furthermore, disposable income of both workers and non-workers is 
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higher than in the original specification. The enhanced R&D expenditures lead to higher spill-
overs to human capital, which results in a more efficiënt use of labour in the production process 
and consequently in a downward effect on the demand for labour. Ceteris paribus this leads to 
a higher labour productivity which has an upward pressure on the wages and hence on 
disposable income and consumption. Finally, higher consumption boosts production as the 
model is demand determined. 
injhe case of ahgusehold levy, a doublé dividend no longer occurs under this redistributipn 
, scheme. Labour demand slightly decreases, while unemployment increases by 0.1 %-point. The 
negative effect on the demand for labour resulting from increased expenditures on R&D 
dominates the substitution effects to labour due to lower labour costs. 
3.3 Sensitivity analysis 
Obviously the results obtained in the previous sections depend upon the chosen parameter values 
of the model. In this section we will investigate how sensitive the outcomes are with respect to 
the values of some key parameters. By varying these parameter values we may also get more 
insight in the relative (empirical) importance of the various mechanisms at work in the model. 
The most important parameters in our simulation experiments are the substitution elastiekjes 
betweenjpjnjtoe one hand energy and on the pther hand labour and capital and the price elasticity 
of energy use. 
First we will look at the substitution possibilities between energy and capital. In our basic 
specification the (direct) substitution elasticity between energy and capital is set to 0.33. When 
this substitution elasticity is doubled it appears that the effect of a general energy levy of 50% 
on labour demand is, according to the 'employers' scenario', much smaller than in the basic 
version of the model. Now less substitution will take place from energy to labour in favour of 
substitution to capital and R&D. Consequently, expenditures on energy saving R&D increase. 
The substition possibilities between energy and labour can be decreased by decreasing the 
elasticity of substitution between capital and labour. From table 4 we leam that a decrease of 
the latter elasticity from 0.8 to 0.5 results in a smaller increase in labour demand as less 
substitution to labour takes place. 
As no decisive conclusion can be drawn from the empirical literature with respect to the 
substitution elasticity between labour and human capital, this parameter is an obvious candidate 
for sensitivity analysis. Lowering this elasticity from 1.25 to 0.8 does not alter the results much. 
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Note that the fact that an energy levy has only a minor impact on spill-overs may influence this 
result. The impact of the spill-overs is lowering the weight of the spill-overs in the CES-
equation for human capital from two-third to one-third and lowering the weight of human capital 
in the CES-function for efficiency units of labour from 0.5 to 0.25. Now the effect of the 
energy levy on labour demand is smaller, since the influence of the fall in spill-overs on labour 
demand is less. 
A lower price elasticity of industrial energy use mitigates, not surprisingly, the reduction in 
industrial energy use. Consequently less substitution takes place between energy and the other 
factors of production including labour. A higher price elasticity of household energy use 
increases household energy savings but has almost no (additional) effect on the production 
structure and hence on the boost in employment. 
One of the major mechanisms of the model is the effect of the lower labour productivity on 
wage costs and hence on labour demand. To test for this mechanism table 4 gives the results 
of an alternative specification with a long term effect of labour productivity on wage costs of 
0.75 in stead of 1.0. The table shows that only wage costs are affected signifïcantly, which 
tempts one to conclude that factor substitution is mainly driven by higher energy prices and the 
wage cost reduction through the redistributed revenues of the tax and only to a minor extent by 
the second-order effect that lower labour productivity leads to a downward pressure on wages 
and hence boosts labour demand. 
Apart from price- and substitution elasticities the scope of the levy plays an important role. So, 
finally, the effects of an international energy levy are studied. Since the EnTech-model is not 
designed for this purpose, this exercise is implemented in a rudimentary way by assuming that 
the effect of the energy levy on the import prices is proportional with the effect on domestic 
prices. It appears that the results do not differ very much from a national levy, where domestic 
prices only increase to a minor extent and hence the international competitive position does not 
deteriorate much. 
4. Concluding remarks 
In this paper we have tested the doublé dividend hypothesis using a relatively simple and 
aggregated empirical macro-economie model for the Netherlands, called the EnTech-model. The 
EnTech-model especially highlights the role of technological progress in production and 
endogenises the direction (bias) of technical progress. 
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Simulation e^ejimentó wiA an energy levy of 50% learn that at least in the short and middle-
Jong run a doublé dividend can occur. A decrease in the wedge between labour costs borne by 
the employer and the net income received by the employee induces substitution effects to labour. 
These effects are enhanced by substitution effects induced by a shift in the direction of 
technological progress from labour saving to energy saving technological progress. A general 
levy yields stronger effects than a levy on the energy use of households only. Under a general 
levy production may decrease, but on the other hand the ppsitive effects on energy_use and 
employ^entjie^sjo.JaTger. 
Exercises using the EnTech-model illustrate how the relative importance of the economie 
mechanisms, which are relevant in the discussions on the effects of energy levies, depends upon 
the size of the substitution elasticities between energy. labour, technology capital and physical 
capital. Inspired by modern endogenous growth theory, the specification of the production block 
pays special attention to the spill-overs from technology capital to human capital. These spill-
overs, which represent the positive externalities of R&D investments, are important for the 
impact of an energy levy on employment. The negative income effect of the energy levy results 
in a decrease in economie activity and hence in a decrease in employment, whilethe substitution 
effect enhances labour demand. Furthermore, in the EnTech-model the f all in economie activity 
will lead to less investments in R&D, so that there are also less spill-overs to human capital and 
thus an upward pressure on labour demand. Therefore, the net effect on labour demand is 
ambiguous and more positive (or less negative) according to our model than according to a 
model which does not endogenise technical progress in such a manner. The fact that the relative 
increase in the energy price induced by the levy leads to a greater share of investments in 
energy saving R&D further complicates the picture. Yet, given the selected parameter values 
of the basic version of our model, the higher share of investments in energy saving R&D is not 
enough to offset the decrease in total R&D expenditures. Hence, investments in energy saving 
R&D also decrease due to the energy levy. Therefore, we advocate that (a small) part of the 
proceeds of the energy levy is used for additional investments in R&D expenditures, although 
this way of redistribution has a negative effect on employment as compared to other 
redistribution schemes. 
However, these outcomes of the model largely hinge on our selection of the parameter values. 
When calibrating the model we have tried to use as much information as is available from the 
literature. Yet, more empirical information on the structure of production and especially on the 
size of the externalities of R&D expenditures is essential for a proper quantitative assessment 
of the effects of an energy levy on energy use and employment in case one believes (and we do) 
that the mechanisms modelled in this paper are of importance. 
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Tables 
Table 1. A regulating energy levy of 50%: employers-scenario 
General levy Household levy 
Year 1 3 5 1 3 5 
Production % 0.2 -0.4 -0.7 0.2 0.1 0.1 
Price of production % 1.0 1.1 0.8 0.0 -0.4 -0.8 
Labour demand 1000 ly. 31.4 49.9 50.4 0.8 4.5 6.7 
Unemployment %-point -0.5 -0.7 -0.7 -0.0 -0.1 -0.1 
Wage costs % -1.1 -3.1 -4.6 -0.6 -1.3 -2.0 ' 
Disposable income workers % 4.1 0.7 -0.3 2.4 1.0 0.8 
Disposable income non-workers % 2.7 -0.3 -1.1 1.9 0.7 0.6 
Consumption % 2.2 0.6 -0.7 1.4 0.8 0.5 
Total energy use % -11.0 -19.6 -22.3 -5.0 -8.7 -9.7 
Research and development % -0.0 -0.7 -1.4 -0.0 -0.2 -0.4 
ofwhich: energy saving, R&D % 3.9 3.3 2.7 0.0 -0.1 -0.3 
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Table 2. A regulatmg energy levy of 50%: employees scenario 
General levy Household levy 
Year 1 3 5 1 3 5 
Production % 0.5 -0.1 -0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 
Price of production % 1.5 2.2 2.4 0.4 0.4 0.2 
Labour demand 1000 ly. 30.0 49.4 46.6 0.1 4.8 5 .3 -
Unemployment %-point -0.5 -0.7 -0.6 -0.0 -0.1 -0.1 * 
Wage costs % -0.2 -0.9 -1.5 0.0 -0.0 -0.1 
Disposable income workerj % 7.3 4.6 4.5 4.4 3.5 3.7 
Disposable income non-workers % 5.4 2.9 2.7 3.6 2.7 2.9 
Consumption % 4.2 3.6 2.8 2.6 2.7 2.6 
Total energy use % -10.4 -18.1 -20.3 -4.6 -7.6 -8.2-
Research and development % 0.2 0.0 -0.2 0.1 0.3 0.3 
ofwhich: energy saving R&D % 4.1 4.0 3.8 0.1 0.3 0.4 
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Table 3. A regulating energy levy of 50%: R&D-scenario 
Year 1 
Production % 0.2 
Price of production % 0.9 
Labour demand 1000 ly. 25.8 
Unemployment %-point -0.4 
Wage costs % -1.0 
Disposable income workers % 4.1 
Disposable income non-workers % 2.8 
Consumption % 2.3 
Total energy use % -11.0 
Research and development % 6.0 
ofwhich: energy saving R&D % 10.1 
General levy Household levy 
3 5 1 3 5 
-0.3 -0.4 0.2 0.2 0.4 
0.9 0.6 0.0 -0.5 -0.9 
36.0 32.3 -2.6 -3.9 -4.0 
-0.5 -0.4 0.0 0.1 0.1 
-2.7 -3.8 -0.5 -1.1 -1.5 
0.8 0.1 2.4 1.1 1.1 
0.0 -0.5 2.0 0.9 1.0 
0.8 -0.3 1.4 0.9 0.8 
-19.5 -22.1 -5.0 -8.6 -9.5 
9.8 12.7 3.7 6.3 8.3 
14.2 17.4 3.7 6.4 8.4 
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Table 4. Sensitivity analysis on a levy of 50%: employers scenario 
Year5 
energy energy pro- labour wage 
use R&D duction demand costs 
(%) (%) 
General levy industrial 
Original specification -27.1 2.7 -0.7 5.8 -4.6 
More subst. energy / capital -26.7 4.1 -0.4 3.1 -3.7 
Less subst. capital / labour -26.4 4.1 -0.6 4.5 -4.2 
Less subst. labour / human capital -27.1 2.8 -0.7 5.4 -4.4 
Less effect of spill-overs -26.7 3.0 -0.5 3.8 -3.7 
Lower price elast. industrial energy use -19.5 2.9 -0.6 4.3 -4.0 
Higher price elast. household energy use -27.1 2.7 -0.8 5.6 -4.4 
Less effect of labour productivity on -26.5 3.0 -0.7 5.4 -3.5 
wages 
International energy levy -26.5 3.1 -0.4 6.4 -4.2 
Household levy household 
Original specification -17.7 -0.3 0.1 0.8 -2.0 
Higher price elast. household energy use -25.5 -0.3 0.0 0.6 -1.8 
Less effect of labour productivity on -17.6 -0.2 0.1 0.7 -1.9 
wages 
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Notes 
1. Most policy proposals consider an energy levy which is partly based on energy use and 
partly on the carbon contents of energy. In our simulation model we simply implement an 
energy levy as a rise in the price of energy. 
2. Their study has been very influential in the decision of the Dutch government not to 
impose a general energy levy unilaterally, but to restrict the scope of the levy to the 
'household' sector (including small enterprises in the sheltered sector). 
3. Empirical specifications of demand for labour as a derived demand equation often include 
an autonomous time trend representing the effects of labour saving technical progress. Such 
labour demand specification would not concord with the set-up of our model. 
4. We note that this modelling of spill-overs poses a problem for the formal derivation of 
the factor demand equations from cost minimisation, because it yields two different 
specifications for the factor demand equations for (cumulated) R&D. In our actual model 
specification the problem is circumvented by taking labour demand as the residual factor. 
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Appendix A. EnTech model equations 
Production 
>„ -(«,/• c'P' +(1 ~«y)KC~'"Y**, ^=0.65; Pytt=Q25 (*>, detennines Lc (A. 1) 
L
 c= , determines L (A.2) 
e
 l+05(l- / i ) 
L ={aLa *"''+( 1 -a^HC"'')"1*1, aL=05; p^ -02 , determines a * (A.3) 
*c=k*r~"+o -«^/ 'T**. «*=°-9; p*=2 (A-4) 
K =i +(1 -o,)*.,, bk =0.072 (A.6) 
r
,=(««77'" +(1 -«O TT'')"""> «K=0-8; P.= "0-5 (A.7) 
T^l-bJT^+RD,, 5r=0.15 (A.8) 
T X I - W ^ - H Ï D , (A.9) 
£«-(«*E "'-+(! - » J V")""'". ««=0-9; P«-<>-2 (A-10) 
^ The values of o in the factor demand equations are Allen partial elasticities of 
substitution. The Allen partial elasticities in lower levels of the nested CES-structure (&U 
are related to those in the next higher level ( c^ ) by the following equality, 
where SUih refers to the total share of the input in the higher level. The direct elasticities of 
substitution (o^,) between the inputs in the CES-equations are determined, using the 
presented values of p, by 
* '
 l 
P+l 
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r£=(i-sr)rE.1+«D£ (A. 
HC - ( o ^ . ^ + d -^[T^T^T,]-'-)'1""", «^=0.33; pfc=4 (A.12) 
a * =const +a +0.4(0.95 - ^ t ) , determines a (A.13) 
J
 a 
Factor demand 
p
*. ln(i) =const +021n(i.,) +0.81n(>0 -0.051n(_i) +0.21n(gi) 
y 
+0.8<r SLln(w) -«0.8 aJSJa(P„) +0.8 <rfcS,ln(P£) 
P 
+VSLln(w) ^ ^ ( P ^ +afa5tln(Pt) 
•P-E-
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(A.14) 
P / ^ (A.15) 
WED,) =const +0.71n(PD,_,) +0.31n(y) -0.11n(_^) 
+0.3a 5Lln(>v) +03a f c ^n( /V +03ojSja(P,) 
p 
]n(RD) =eonst +051n(y) -0.71n(_^) +1.71n(tec/j£a/0 
Py (A. 17) 
ln(£) =co/m +051n(£'.1) +051n(y) -0.3751n(_±) 
P (A.lö) 
+05a)„5tln(w) +05fffe5>(PRO) +05afe5JJn(PJt) 
7?D P 
In( £) -anur +0.1 ln( —1) (A. 19) 
p 
ln( c£) =co/m +051n( c£.,) -0251n( - 2 ) nO^ln^,) (A.20) 
Demand 
y =const +05y (A.21) 
J«'±SJ (A.22) 
y^^My^-y^) (A-23> 
« » - f (A-24> 
>«.= c +c£+I'+I'»» +/</ +s«, -%+b ~m +n (A-25) 
n =0.005^ (A.26) 
ln(c) =contf +021n(c ,) +0.641n(yt) -0.31n(-ÜL!l ) (A.27) 
P '., +100 
l n ( / J -o»ur +021n( f^.,) +0.81n(y) -021n( _*) (A.28) 
ln(è) =c<witf +051n(t.1) +1.0(ln(m J -051n(m„,.,)) +1.0In(_^) +0.11n(nv_2) (A.29) 
P 
ln(m) =const +051n(m.,) +1.0(ln(>0 -051n (>>_,)) -0.3751n(—) 
P„ (A.3U) 
+051n(gt) -0.081n (riv.j) 
m 
m = — (A.31) 
ln( riv) =ln(-Ii.) (A.32) 
F r . 
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Prices 
InCPy) =const +051n(Pj,_1) +055Lln(w) -02]n(af) +0.451n(l +TW) 
+0.0451n(tft-0.85) +055fin(P£) +05Skln(Pk) +055 t tln(Pw) (A.33) 
l n (P ; 
1 +m 
i n ( p ; wi. 
1 +m MPJ (A.34) 
P -P 
P=100_ï £ 
y,-i 
(A.35) 
P =P (A.36) 
ln(w) =const +0.81n(w.,) +021n(P,) +0.11n(_Z) -056(1 -qj 
+021n(ap +0.0641n(RR) +0.051n(l +?•„) +0.17111(1+7,) 
(A.37) 
w. = , 
w 
' PJH+T} 
(A.38) 
P =P 
P -P 
100 P, 
+ « / , (A.39) 
Pf-Q35i»,40j65/» 
r=const +0.15P * +0.15^+0.7^ -O.lè ' 
e '=e 
Pn-const+OAP^iOAw 
(A.40) 
(A.41) 
(A.42) 
(A.43) 
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Government 
u_ 
TT 
(AAS) 
* -
= a 2 { i r ^ r } (A'46) 
*-^<££> (A-47) 
* - - " • < ÏTT* (A-49) 
»«-W. (A.50) 
w«fte-_ff£^_ v (A.52) 
w(a +a„) 
Ta=wedge-T (A.53) 
>V=( 1 -TJw r(a **_) • i V ' V +M,„-«rf +wO0wa«w (A-54) 
ln(<0 =const +05\a{a^_x) +05In(a J +0.151n(gI) (A.55) 
V=aa-a-aim-aaa (A.56) 
*L«l-£ (A-57) 
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Appendix B. Glossary of symbols 
Variable Definition 
a industrial employment 
a " full capacity demand for labour 
a 
a 
labour supply 
a 
aow 
number of people receiving old age and survivors' benefits (AOW/AWW) 
a
ml non-manufacturing demand for labour (autonomous) 
a t 
industrial labour productivity 
a 
tov 
govemmental demand for labour (number of civil servants) 
a
* number of people receiving benefits excl. AOW/AWW 
a
~ 
working age population 
b volume of exports(r) 
c volume of consumption excl. household energy use 
CE volume of household energy use 
è' expected change in exchange rate 
E volume of industrial energy use 
Ec efficiency units of industrial energy use 
fd, volume of govemmental deficit 
FTC foreign technology capital 
8, volume of government expenditure on education 
8a volume of other government expenditures (autonomous) 
8*Ü volume of (net) govemmental expenditures on wages 
8uu volume of expenditures on benefits 
h contractual working time 
HC human capital 
i volume of (gross) fixed investment in industry 
h volume of investment in dwellings 
All volumes are in constant prices of 1980. 
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Variable Definition 
i volume of non-manufacturing investment (excl. dwellings) 
K volume of (physical) capital stock 
Kc efficiency units of capital incl. energy 
KT efficiency units of capital excl. energy 
L efficiency units of labour 
L efficiency units of labour, corrected for contractual working time 
m volume of imports 
m ratio of imports to national income 
m index of world trade 
w 
n volume of stockbuilding 
ir share of unemployed in total number of people receiving benefits 
P rate of inflation (refers to industrial output price) 
p ' expected rate of inflation 
P t t aggregated household price of energy 
PE aggregated industrial price of energy 
Pt price index of investment goods 
Pk rental price of capital services 
Pm price index of imports 
PRD P " c e m (^e x or" ^-&D 
Py expenditure price index 
p price of industrial output 
qk rate of capacity utilization 
qL utilisation rate of labour 
r long term interest rate 
r^ long term foreign interest rate 
RDd volume of domestic expenditures on R&D, excl. energy saving R&D 
RD
 E volume of domestic expenditures on energy saving R&D 
RD, volume of import of knowledge (Ucences) 
riv relative innovative power 
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Variable Definition 
rk short term interest rate ('money market rate') 
RR replacement ratio 
T indirect tax burden 
*. direct tax burden for employees 
am 
other tax revenues (autonomous) 
Tc total stock of technology capital, excl. energy saving technology capital 
T< domestic stock of technology capital, excl. energy saving technology capital 
U direct tax revenues 
TE stock of energy saving technology capital 
techgap index of technology gap 
Tt stock of imported technology capital 
<w indirect tax revenues 
' , 
direct tax burden for employers 
U unemployment 
w nominal gross wages in industry 
w 
atnv 
real net benefit rate AOW/AWW 
wedge nominal wedge between gross and net wages 
w real net wages of civil servants 
w 
r 
real gross wages in industry 
W
« 
real net benefit level non-AOW/AWW 
y volume of manufacturing output / actual demand 
y> volume of total disposable income 
yH productive capacity in industry 
'nat 
volume of gross national product 
y« desired productive capacity in industry 
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